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ATTORNEY DISQUALIFICATION
Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v.
Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc.
607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979)
The attorney's conduct towards clients and former clients is always
subject to the ethical obligations of the legal profession.I In particular,
the attorney owes to clients a general duty of loyalty which includes the
obligation to preserve the confidentiality inherent in, and necessary to,
the lawyer-client relationship. 2 Because of this duty, an attorney gener-
ally should decline employment which involves representing an interest
adverse to that of a former client.3 If the attorney accepts the adverse
employment, the former client may seek the attorney's disqualification
from further participation in the matter.4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
cently dealt with such a situation in Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium
A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc.-5 The court in Novo ex-
amined the issues involved when a party seeks to have its former law
firm disqualified from representing an opposing party in a suit, and
1. See generally H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (1953); G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE
OF LAW (1978) [hereinafter cited as HAZARD]; R. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1970).
2. The ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY [hereinafter referred to in text as the
Code of Professional Responsibility] explains the justification for this requirement as follows:
A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must
be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer
should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his
client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system .... The observance of the ethi-
cal obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not
only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the
client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance.
Id ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 4-1 (footnotes omitted). See also United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
136 F. Supp. 345, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
3. See, e.g., T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953),
where the court explained that duty as "[a] lawyer's duty of absolute loyalty to his client's interests
does not end with his retainer. He is enjoined for all time, except as he may be released by law,
from disclosing matters revealed to him by reason of the confidential relationship." Id at 268.
The same restraint is imposed after termination of the attorney-client relationship by the ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 4-6.
4. See Annot., Propriety and Effect of Attorney Representing Interest Adverse to that of For-
mer Client, 52 A.L.R.2d 1243 (1957):
The comment may be made that an attorney's misconduct is not so limited in its effect as
to give rise only to questions involving the attorney's professional status: the practice of
law being, by its nature, representative, wrongful acts on the part of an attorney will
inevitably touch upon the rights of his clients and his adversaries.
Id at 1276.
5. 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979).
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concluded that, in the circumstances of Novo, disqualification was not
required.
This case comment will examine the various ethical and policy
considerations involved in disqualifications of counsel, as well as the
body of case law which has developed in this area. The comment will
analyze the Seventh Circuit's reasoning and establish that the court's
recognition that an "appearance of impropriety" can be rebutted by an
examination of the facts is a reasonable response to the complex issues
involved. Moreover, it is more likely to yield equitable results than the
application of a more rigid rule.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Code of Professional Responsibility
The American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity provides one standard for analyzing the ethical responsibility of a
lawyer. 6 When faced with disqualification issues, the courts have fre-
quently turned to this standard for guidance. 7 Three specific canons of
the Code are relevant in evaluating the ethical stance of the attorney
representing an interest adverse to that of a former client.
Canon 4 provides that a "lawyer should preserve the confidences
and secrets of a client."'8 The imposition of this duty encourages the
free flow of information from client to attorney and facilitates the dis-
closure that is necessary for the lawyer to provide competent and in-
formed legal services. The client may repose confidence in the attorney
secure in the knowledge that any such confidences will never be used to
the client's disadvantage regardless of whether the attorney-client rela-
tionship continues.9
Canon 5 provides that the attorney "exercise independent profes-
sional judgment" on his client's behalf, untainted by self-interest or the
conflicting interests of another client. '0 Clearly, an attorney who repre-
6. The Code is composed of three parts. The canons are "statements of axiomatic norms,"
the ethical considerations are "aspirational ... and represent the objective toward which every
member of the profession should strive," and the disciplinary rules are "mandatory in character"
representing the minimum level of professional conduct. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT, CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
7. This comment will deal primarily with the treatment of disqualification in the federal
courts. The Code of Professional Responsibility and its predecessor, the Canons of Professional
Ethics, have been the basis for most of these decisions. In some cases, federal district courts have
adopted the Code as part of their general rules. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 8A, 8D.
8. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 4.
9. See note 4 supra.
10. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 5 and the related ethical consider-
ations and disciplinary rules.
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sents someone suing a former client would be in a difficult ethical posi-
tion. He faces an inherent conflict between the duties owed to his two
clients if he cannot exercise his best professional judgment on behalf of
one client for fear of violating the duty of confidentiality owed to the
other."I It is this ethical conflict that underlies the prohibition against
representing an interest adverse to that of a former client.
A third Code provision, canon 9, provides that the lawyer should
"avoid even the appearance of impropriety."' 12 This requires that,
when the conduct in question is ethically marginal, concern for the im-
age of the profession as a whole should resolve any doubts in favor of
the ethical posture. Occasionally, canon 9 has been used to require dis-
qualification of attorneys when no actual conflict of interest existed. 13
Additionally, the Code requires that,. if an attorney is forced to
withdraw from representing a particular interest, any attorney affiliated
with him or his firm is likewise disqualified. 14 This vicarious disqualifi-
cation' .5 arises, in part, from the lawyer's duty to uphold the image of
the profession by avoiding even the "appearance of impropriety."' 16 It
also rests upon the presumption that any client confidences are accessi-
ble to the professional associates of the lawyer in whom they were re-
posed.17 If the confidential information can be used to the client's
detriment, all attorneys in the firm are barred from the representa-
tion. ' 8
These provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility express
the legal profession's concept of ethical conduct. They also provide the
basic framework which the courts have used in deciding motions for
11. See Liebman, The Changing Law ofDisqualiication: The Role of Presumption and Policy,
73 Nw. U.L. REV. 996, 997-98 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as Liebman].
12. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 9.
13. The apparent basis of canon 9 is concern that merely avoiding actual impropriety is in-
sufficient to instill public confidence and trust in the legal profession. O'Toole, Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. An Elusive Guideline, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 313, 318 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as O'Toole].
14. This is required by the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RULE 5-
105(d).
15. Vicarious disqualification is the term used when the attorney or law firm who is the sub-
ject of the disqualification motion has not had direct contact with the client seeking disqualifica-
tion. Rather, the motion is based upon the attorney's or firm's association with another attorney
who is tainted by having served in some legal capacity for that client. Note, Attorney's Conflict of
Interest." Representation of Interest Adverse to that of Formner Client, 55 B.U. L. REV. 61, 74 (1975)
[hereinafter referred to as Attorney's Conflict of Interest].
16. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 9.
17. Attorney's Conflict ofInterest, supra note 15, at 70.
18. Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978); Schloetter v.
Railoc, 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976); Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management
Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
disqualification. A concern for these basic principles underpins most of
the disqualification decisions.
Tests Applied by the Courts
In addition to the profession's own official statements of ethics, the
courts have developed certain tests and modes of analysis which they
use in judging attorney conduct. One such test is the "substantial rela-
tionship test." First enunciated in T C Theatre Corp. v. Warner Broth-
ers Pictures,1 9 this test has been used frequently by the courts in deter-
mining the need for disqualification.20 Under this rule, if an attorney
represents someone suing a former client, and if the current action is
substantially related to the work done for the former client, the attor-
ney should be disqualified.
In T C Theatre, an attorney was representing theater owners in an
antitrust suit against his former client, Universal. The attorney had
previously defended Universal in the appeal of a government antitrust
suit involving essentially the same allegations. Universal moved to
have its former attorney disqualified from any further participation in
the suit.
In discussing the duty of the attorney to preserve the confidences
and secrets of a former client, the court stated that it must ask "whether
it can reasonably be said that in the course of the former representa-
tion, the attorney might have acquired information related to the sub-
ject of his subsequent representation."' 21 This concern for the
preservation of client confidences is the foundation of the substantial
relationship test. In a situation where there is no likelihood of client
confidences being disclosed or used against the client, there is no need
to disqualify the attorney.22 No substantial relationship exists between
the two representations. By requiring this relationship, the court in
T C Theatre assumed that disqualification would not occur when there
was no likelihood that relevant confidences had been disclosed to the
attorney by the former client. In this way, the test protects attorney
interests in accepting employment that does not actually violate the
ethical precepts of the profession.
Implicit in the T C Theatre opinion is the presumption that, once
the substantial relationship is found, actual disclosure of confidences
19. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
20. Id. at 268 n.3.
21. Id. at 269.
22. See Liebman, supra note 1I, at 1001.
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from client to attorney will be conclusively presumed. 23 Once a reason-
able probability that the client had made disclosures has been shown
from the nature of the earlier representation, no further inquiry is
needed. The attorney in T C Theatre claimed that he had dealt only
with the "cold record" 24 in handling the Universal appeal; that is, that
he had not discussed the case with the client but had merely prepared
the appeal from the record of the trial. Thus, the only information he
had received was that which had already been uncovered by the gov-
ernment in the trial. The T C Theatre court did not accept the attor-
ney's contention that Universal should be required to prove some
disclosure of confidences because any such requirement would neces-
sarily "tear aside the protective cloak drawn about the lawyer client
relationship. ' 25 Disclosure of confidences is presumed in the nature of
the relationship. 26
A second presumption operates to impute the same confidences to
the disqualified attorney's partners and associates. 27 Under this view,
23. On this point, the court explained: "The court will assume that during the course of the
former representation confidences were disclosed to the attorney bearing on the subject matter of
the representation. It will not inquire into their nature and extent." 113 F. Supp. at 268.
24. Id at 267.
25. Id at 269. But cf Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp.,
216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954), where the court said "[plerhaps in certain situations to prevent hard-
ship to a lawyer not necessary to the protection of the client, the judge might ascertain the content
of prior disclosures in an in camera session." Id at 926. The court in Consolidated Theatres,
however, found such a session too burdensome to be appropriate in the context of complex anti-
trust litigation.
26. The court in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), ex-
plained this rule in the following terms:
The rationale behind this rule is as sound as it is elementary. The confidences communi-
cated by a client to his attorney must remain inviolate for all time if the public is to have
reverence for the law and confidence in its guardians. . . The client must be secure in
his belief that the lawyer will be forever barred from disclosing confidences reposed in
him. It follows that if, in order to protect his secret utterances to counsel, the client or
former client is required to reveal these utterances, the very purpose of the rule of secrecy
will be destroyed, and the free flow of information from client to attorney, so vital to our
system ofjustice will be irreparably damaged. Therefore. . .the courts will assume that
when a client entrusts an attorney with the handling of a particular matter, the client will
reveal to that counsel all the information at his disposal. . . This assumption, how-
ever, is reasonable only so long as there is a substantial relationship between those for-
mer matters and the lawsuit in which the confidence question is raised.
Id at 355. See also Attorney's Conflict of Interest, supra note 15, at 74. But cf. Government of
India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978), where Judge Mansfield, in his concurring
opinion stated that he was "reluctant to endorse the district court's unqualified statement to t he
effect that once a substantial relationship is shown . . . and that the lawyer's personal role in the
former representation was more than peripheral, the presumption that the attorney had access to
confidential information in the prior relationship is 'irrebuttable.'" Id at 741 (Mansfield, I., con-
curring).
27. Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978); Schloetter v.
Railoc, 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1978); Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir,
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit Manage-
ment Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954).
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the client is represented by the firm, collectively, through the attorney
who is actually involved in the representation. 28 Consequently, the
firm is bound by the ethical duty to the client. Factually, this imputa-
tion of client confidences rests on the real likelihood that these confi-
dences might be disclosed within the firm. It recognizes that the firm's
files are generally accessible to all attorneys and that, within that firm,
lawyers might discuss current matters. As long as the association be-
tween the disqualified attorney and the law firm continues, all members
of the firm are likewise disqualified. 29
Once the association between the tainted attorney and the law firm
has ended, the presumption that imputes the client confidences to other
members of the law firm can generally be rebutted. 30 This principle
was developed in Laskey Brothers v. Warner Brothers Pictures.31 In
Laskey, an attorney, Isacson, was disqualified from representing the
plaintiff because of work he had done for one of the defendants in a
substantially related matter.32 Because of that, his partner, Malkan,
was also disqualified from representing the plaintiff, despite the fact
that the partnership was later dissolved. Malkan was conclusively pre-
sumed to have had access to confidential information about Isacson's
former client.33 However, in a second suit involving the same defend-
28. The court in Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976), espoused
this view. In this case, the plaintiffs attorney had a partner who was also a partner in a firm in
another city. That firm was representing the defendant. The court explained:
Because he is a partner in the Jaeckle firm, Mr. Fleischmann owes the duty of undi-
vided loyalty to that firm's client, Cinerama. Because he is a partner in the Webster firm,
he owes the same duty to Cinema 5, Ltd. It can hardly be disputed that there is at least
the appearance of impropriety where half his time is spent with partners who are defend-
ing Cinerama in multi-million dollar litigation, while the other half is spent with part-
ners who are suing Cinerama in a lawsuit of equal substance.
Id at 1387. The court viewed this case as involving the concurrent representation of adverse
interests. In these cases, where the client is viewed to be the client of the firm rather than of the
attorney who is handling the matter, the courts tend to see the marked appearance of impropriety
and disqualify counsel regardless of any real possibility of disclosure of client confidences. Under
this view, the same counsel is appearing for both sides in the litigation, a marked violation of the
duty of loyalty to the client. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d
1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); International Business Machines Corp. v. Levin,
579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978).
29. Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978); Harmar Drive-In
Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 239 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1956); Laskey Bros. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); W.E. Bassett Co. v.
H.C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn. 1961), affldper curiam, 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962).
30. Gas-a-tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
861 (1976); Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 932 (1956); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 432 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Mo.), aft'd, 566 F.2d
602 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978). See also Attorney's Conflict ofInterest, supra
note 15, at 75.
31. 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956).
32. 224 F.2d at 826.
33. Id.
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ant and a similar complaint, Malkan was permitted to rebut the pre-
sumption that he had received confidential information from Isacson.
In the second suit, the plaintiff had sought Malkan's assistance after the
partnership with Isacson had ended. 34 Arguably, since the same de-
fendant and same type of suit were involved, it would seem that any
presumptions should apply in the same manner to both. However, as
long as the partnership continued, the appearance of unethical conduct
as well as the possibility of actual disclosure continued. Once the rela-
tionship ended, that possibility of disclosure ended and the appearance
of impropriety also was reduced.
In choosing to allow the presumption to be rebutted, the court in
Laskey Brothers expressed concern over unjustified interference with
the client's right to qualified counsel of his choice. 35  Particularly in
specialized areas of law such as motion picture antitrust litigation, the
area involved in Laskey Brothers, the court reasoned that it could be-
come difficult to find an attorney with the requisite expertise who had
not at some time been associated, at least vicariously, with the adverse
party.36 Perhaps it was the court's recognition of this problem, along
with the diminished appearance of impropriety, that led the court to
allow the presumption to be rebutted.3 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
cently considered a similar situation in Schloetter v. Railoc.38 In the
course of defending a patent infringement suit for Railoc, the defend-
ing firm discovered that a former partner in the firm, Jeffrey, had filed
the patents for Schloetter that were the subject of the suit. At the time,
Jeffrey had been handling patent matters for the firm's Washington,
34. Id.
35. id at 827.
36. In this regard, the court stated its opinion that: "The net effect of an overharsh rule of
disqualification must be to hinder adequate protection of clients' interests in view of the difficulty
in discovering technically trained attorneys in specialized areas who were not disqualified due to
their peripheral or temporally remote connections with attorneys for the other side." Id.
37. The courts have expressed a related concern for the careers of young attorneys as well as
government attorneys returning to private practice. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975); Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224
F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros.
Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F.
Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See generally Liebman supra note ii. Through extensive contact with
large or specialized law firms or government agencies, attorneys may be prohibited from repre-
senting a large number of clients. This would tend to inhibit their employment prospects as other
firms would not wish to share their taint. The problems of former government attorneys have
been written about extensively. See, e.g., Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1957); Note, Conflicts of Interest and the
Former Government Attorney, 65 GEO. L.J. 1025 (1977); HAzARD, supra note 1, at 107-19.
38. 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976).
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D.C. office. The district court found the evidence insufficient to rebut
the presumption that Jeffrey had shared confidences with other mem-
bers of the firm,39 and the Seventh Circuit agreed. 40 In addition, the
Seventh Circuit recognized that canon 941 required the firm's disqualifi-
cation. Several factors led to that conclusion. Because of the con-
tinuity of the membership in the firm, many of the lawyers who had
been present in the firm when Jeffrey had filed the patents were still
members of the firm.42 Also relevant was the identical subject matter
of the two representations: the firm was in the position of attacking a
patent which it had filed.4 3 Finally, it was not at all clear that the rela-
tionship between Jeffrey and the firm was completely ended. The firm
had been reorganized into two offices and several attorneys were part-
ners in both the "parent" firm and the "associated" firm of which Jef-
frey was still a member. While treating the presumption as rebuttable,
the court relied heavily on canon 9's proscription where conduct was
marginally ethical. 44
Generally, as the courts have applied the ethical requirements of
the legal profession to different fact situations, they have maintained a
flexible posture. Although these rules and tests have been developed,
their application to different situations has not been rigid. Rather, the
courts have tended to balance concern for the image of the profession
with certain policy considerations,45 at least as long as there was no real
likelihood of harm to the client's interests. It is against this background
that the decision in Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Trav-
enol Laboratories, Inc. 46 must be examined.
39. Id. at 711.
40. Id.
41. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
42. 546 F.2d at 711.
43. Id at 712.
44. Id at 709-10.
45. See generally O'Toole supra note 13. O'Toole's analysis of federal cases identifies five
interests which affect the courts' use of canon 9:
!. The public's and the legal profession's interest in maintaining the highest standards
of professional conduct and in ensuring the scrupulous administration of justice;
2. The litigant's interest in freely selecting counsel and in maintaining an uninterrupted
attorney-client relationship throughout the course of litigation;
3. The public's and the legal profession's interest in preventing inadvertent disclosure
of confidential information acquired in the course of a former representation and in
avoiding possible conflicts of interest;
4. The social policy interest vindicated by litigation which may be thwarted if the mo-
tion to disqualify is granted, and finally;
5. The practicing attorney's career interests.
Id. at 321-22.
46. 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979). Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S is hereinafter re-
ferred to as Novo. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. is hereinafter referred to as Baxter.
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Novo TERAPEUTISK LABOR, TORIUM A/S v.
BAXTER TR4 VENOL LABORATORIES, INC
Facts of the Case
This litigation arose from a patent infringement claim. In Novem-
ber 1966, Novo filed a patent application for a milk-coagulating en-
zyme; in December 1967, Baxter filed a similar application. In 1971,
the United States Patent Office declared an interference between the
two patents which was resolved in Novo's favor in February 1976.
During 1975 and 1976, Baxter retained the law firm of Hume, Cle-
ments, Brinks, Willian and Olds47 as outside patent counsel. However,
the Hume firm was not involved in the patent interference action with
Novo. During 1975-76, most of Baxter's work was handled by Granger
Cook, a partner in the Hume firm. This work included a two hour
meeting in July 1976, with Baxter in-house attorneys, conferring on a
matter which Cook later claimed involved the same enzyme which was
the subject of the patent infringement suit.48 It was this conference
which gave rise to Baxter's motion to have the Hume firm disquali-
fied.49 In December 1976, Cook left the Hume firm to form his own
firm, and Baxter chose to continue as his client.
In February 1977, the plaintiff, Novo, filed a patent infringement
action against Baxter in the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina.50 The case was transferred to the Northern District
of Illinois, and the Hume firm was granted leave to appear as counsel
for Novo over Baxter's objections.5 Baxter then filed a motion seeking
to disqualify the Hume firm from representing the plaintiff, claiming
that the July 1976 matter handled by Cook was substantially related to
the patent infringement litigation, and that the Hume firm was thus
precluded from representing Novo.5 2 The district court disagreed with
Baxter's contention. The court held that, even if it could be assumed
that the two representations were related, the July representation con-
stituted only two percent of the work done by the Hume firm for Bax-
ter.53 Since the only matter in question had been handled by Cook,
who was still acting as Baxter's attorney, the court did not consider the
47. Hereinafter referred to as the Hume firm.
48. 607 F.2d at 195.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 187.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 189. The district court opinion was not published.
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matter substantially related and denied the motion.54
The Seventh Circuit's Panel and En Banc Opinions
Baxter appealed the denial and the case was heard by a three-
judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit. 55 The court reversed the district court and granted the motion for
disqualification.5 6 The Seventh Circuit held that the district court's de-
cision was based upon a misunderstanding of the substantial relation-
ship test, and that the two representations were substantially related.5 7
On that basis, the court presumed that Baxter had disclosed confiden-
tial information to Cook.5 8 The court concluded that canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility necessarily barred the Hume firm
from representing Novo in this litigation regardless of whether any
other member of the firm had shared in those confidences. 59
Novo moved for a rehearing, and that motion was granted. The
case was reheard by the court en bane in April 1979. The majority
opinion60 agreed with the earlier panel opinion that the representations
were substantially related, and that it must be presumed that Cook re-
ceived confidential information from Baxter. The en bane majority
held, however, that any presumption that Cook in turn had shared
those confidences with other members of the Hume firm should be re-
buttable and had been rebutted in this case.61 Three judges dissented
"for the reasoning given in the panel opinion. 62
The Substantial Relationship Test
Both the panel and en bane opinions applied the same approach to
the substantial relationship determination:
Initially, the trial judge must make a factual reconstruction of the
scope of the prior legal representation. Second, it must be deter-
mined whether it is reasonable to infer that the confidential informa-
tion allegedly given would have been given to a lawyer in those
matters. Finally, it must be determined whether that information is
relevant to the issues raised in the litigation pending against the for-
mer client.6 3
54. Id at 188.
55. The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Fairchild and Cummings and, sitting by designa-
tion, Senior District Judge Grant.
56. 607 F.2d at 186.
57. Id at 189.
58. Id at 192.
59. Id at 192-93.
60. 607 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1979).
61. Id at 197.
62. Id (Swygert, Cummings, Sprecher, JJ., dissenting).
63. Id at 190, 195.
1220
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The court rejected the district court's "quantitative analysis" which had
viewed as not substantial a representation which constituted only two
percent of Baxter's business with the Hume firm.64 The Seventh Circuit
reasoned that "[e]ven the briefest conversation between a lawyer and a
client can result in the disclosure of confidences. It is the relationship
between the prior representation and the present litigation that must be
evaluated rather than simply the duration and extent of the past repre-
sentation. '65 In applying the test, the court found that the prior repre-
sentation, the two hour July meeting, involved the same enzyme which
was the subject of the patent infringement suit. Under those circum-
stances, it was reasonable to assume that confidential information was
disclosed, and that such information would be relevant in the patent
action. Accordingly, the court found a substantial relationship between
the two matters.
66
Presumptions of Access to Information
Both the panel opinion and the en banc majority recognized the
presumption that imputes confidential information to Cook once the
substantial relationship test is met.67 Both opinions also accepted as
realistic the presumption that confidences are shared among partners in
a law firm.6 8 However, where the panel viewed the presumption as
dispositive of the issue,69 the en bane majority rejected that approach as
overly rigid.70 Cook had alleged that he had shared confidences about
Baxter with other members of the Hume firm, but the allegations were
not specific. On the other hand, each remaining member of the Hume
firm had signed an affidavit specifically denying that he or she had re-
ceived any information about the July representation in question. 7'
64. Id. at 195.
65. Id.
66. Id at 195-96. The Seventh Circuit used a similarly broad construction of the substantial
relationship test in Westinghouse v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978). In that case, the
trial court had found no relationship between the law firm's representation of Gulf in regard to
their mineral holdings and their subsequent representation of United Nuclear Corp. in defending
a uranium price-fixing charge. Where the trial court viewed one representation as a property
matter and the other an antitrust matter, the court of appeals found that the law firm's knowledge
of Gulfs mineral holdings could be relevant and disqualified the firm stating that "relevance...
must be measured against the potential avenues of proof and not against the expected." Id at
226.
67. 607 F.2d at 192, 196.
68. Id at 191, 196.
69. Id. at 192.
70. Id. at 197.
71. Id. at 196 n.4.
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The panel opinion regarded the affidavits as being in conflict, creating
a doubt which should be resolved in favor of disqualification. 72 The en
banc majority made clear that an important factual basis for its hold-
ing was the lack of any specific allegation by Cook that the July 1976
representation was ever discussed with anyone else in the firm. 73 Given
that Cook was the person best in a position to know what confidences
he may have disclosed to his associates, and that he was no longer asso-
ciated with the Hume firm, the en banc court held that the presumption
had been rebutted. 74
ANALYSIS
A major distinction between Novo and earlier cases is the court's
willingness to treat Baxter as Cook's client rather than the client of the
Hume firm.75 Baxter had come to the Hume firm for legal advice and
Cook, as a member of the firm, had handled the matter. This differs
from a more typical vicarious disqualification case where an attorney is
associated with a client at one law firm, then moves to a new firm. The
new firm can then be barred from handling any matter adverse to the
former client because of the association with the tainted attorney. 76
Only when the association with that attorney ends does the presump-
tion that other members of the firm have received client confidences
72. Id at 192. The panel majority's view of the affidavits was based upon these doubts:
Judge Fairchild, in his dissent, is of the opinion that Attorney Cook did not allege, even
in general terms, that any confidences were shared or exist. We read . . . the Cook
affidavit in a different light . . . . Although further questioning by Judge Fairchild [at
oral argument] revealed that there was no specific allegation in the Cook affidavit that
confidences received in the 2 / hours were shared, we find enough of a doubt to resolve
the question in favor of disqualification.
Id at n.8.
73. The court explained its position as follows:
Because the conclusion we reach in this case may not have a factual basis in every other
case, it is important to note the following: (I) While Cook's affidavit states that he con-
ferred generally with other members of the Hume firm about the Baxter account, and
that other members of the firm received confidential information about Baxter, there is
no allegation that the July, 1976 representations (which are discussed separately in the
affidavit) were ever discussed with anyone else in the firm. Cook, of course, is in a posi-
tion to know whether confidences were shared since it was he who presumably received
those confidences and who would have shared them if they had been shared. (2) There
are affidavits in the record from all the remaining members of the Hume firm stating that
none of them had any knowledge of the July, 1976 representations.
Id at 196 n.4.
74. Id. at 197.
75. See text at notes 27-29 supra.
76. Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978); Harmar Drive-In
Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 239 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1956); Laskey Bros. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); W.E. Bassett Co. v.
H.C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn. 1961), affldper curiam, 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962).
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become rebuttable. 77 It is the appearance of impropriety that is the
foundation of disqualification in most of these cases since the courts
generally have refused to assume that a law firm or attorney actually
would take unethical advantage of an associate's knowledge of an ad-
versary or that the involved attorney would breach his own ethical duty
to preserve the confidences of his former client.78
As noted above, however, Baxter had been a client of the Hume
firm. One of the underlying reasons for applying vicarious disqualifi-
cation to law firms is that lawyers within a firm will seek each other's
advice and discuss current legal matters, sometimes informally.79
Clearly, Cook could have freely consulted with his colleagues at the
Hume firm about the Baxter account without any breach of his duty to
the client. It follows that, when the law firm to be disqualified has actu-
ally represented the former client, there is a greater possibility that dis-
closures of confidences about the former client were actually made
within the firm. Possibly, there is also less justification for allowing the
rebuttal of the presumption that those disclosures did occur.
The court did not discuss the level and type of evidence needed to
rebut the presumption. The panel majority viewed the possibly con-
flicting affidavits as sufficient to create a factual doubt which should be
resolved in favor of disqualification. 80 The en banc majority found no
conflict and therefore found no need to discuss the "quality or quantity
77. Gas-a-tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cit.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
861 (1976); Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 932 (1956).
78. See, e.g., Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976), where the court
noted that "[n]othing we have heretofore said is intended as criticism of the character and profes-
sional integrity of Mr. Fleischmann and his partners. We are convinced that the dual representa-
tion came about inadvertently and unknowingly." Id. at 1387. And, in T.C. Theatre Corp. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), the court stated: "The Court is not
required to indulge in any presumption that Cooke has divulged confidences reposed in him by
his former clients simply because he is now engaged in a law suit with them. The presumption
would be to the contrary." Id at 272.
79. The Seventh Circuit has been reluctant to modify the presumptions of access to informa-
tion for large law firms. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th
Cit.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). But see Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cit. 1975), where the Second Circuit did allow some modification stating
that it was "absurd to conclude that immediately upon their entry on duty [new attorneys] be-
come the recipients. . . of knowledge of all the files ... and all confidential disclosures ... to
any lawyer in the firm." Id at 753-54. In very large firms, it may be difficult even to discover
conflict within the firm. In Westinghouse, the firm of Kirkland & Ellis did not discover that the
two offices of the firm were doing work for opposing sides in litigation until the suit was actually
filed. See also Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times." The Canons of Ethics and Intra-Firm
Conflicts ofInterest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1073 (1964), where the author found most firms' proce-
dures for discovering conflicts inadequate.
80. 607 F.2d at 192. Accord, International Business Machines Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271,
283 (3d Cir. 1978); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cit. 1975); Chugach Elec. Ass'n
v. United States District Court, 370 F.2d 441, 444 (9th Cit. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967).
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of proof. . . required to rebut the presumption."' s The Seventh Cir-
cuit thus left open whether a specific denial that any confidences had
been received would always be sufficient to rebut the presumption.
Such a denial probably would be enough only in the absence of any
specific allegation to the contrary.
To permit the law firm's denial to rebut the presumption in all
cases is clearly insufficient protection of the client's interests. When
there is a factual dispute as to whether confidences have been disclosed
within a law firm, the client is in no position to prove or disprove that
specific events occurred. In that situation, it would be appropriate for
the court to apply canon 9,82 and resolve the doubts in favor of disqual-
ification. When there is no factual dispute, there is no appearance of
impropriety. Any "appearance" has been refuted by the facts. Given a
district court's refusal to accept similar denials in Schloetter v. Railoc,83
where there was some dispute as to whether confidences had been
shared, and the Seventh Circuit's approval of Schloetter,84 it seems
likely that the Seventh Circuit might follow such a course as the one
outlined above. It should be kept in mind that the clear absence of
factual dispute in Novo is rare. A significant element of the court's
holding in Novo is its recognition that the only people who would know
what confidences have been disclosed are now opposing counsel, and
they still are not in conflict as to the fact of disclosure. This configura-
tion of parties would probably not occur often, and the holding in
Novo may be limited to just such situations.
Another difficulty with the majority opinion is its failure to deal
directly with the issue of canon 9. While the Seventh Circuit panel
opinion apparently viewed the appearance of impropriety as dispositive
of the issue, 85 the court en banc regarded appearance as irrelevant
when no actual impropriety existed.8 6 This points out one of the diffi-
culties inherent in canon 9. There is no standard by which "appear-
ances" can be judged.8 7 It is unclear whether a judge should apply his
own personal standards, attempt a generalized professional standard,
or perhaps avoid any situation which a layman, uninformed of the
facts, might think improper. It has been suggested that the layman
81. 607 F.2d at 197.
82. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
83. See 546 F.2d at 711.
84. See 607 F.2d at 195-96.
85. Id. at 193.
86. Id. at 197.
87. See generally O'Toole, supra note 13, at 337.
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might look with disfavor upon an overly scrupulous attention to canon
9.88 The Fifth Circuit in Woods v. Covington County Bank89 remarked:
Inasmuch as attorneys now commonly use disqualification motions
for purely strategic purposes, such an extreme approach would often
unfairly deny a litigant the counsel of his choosing. Indeed, the more
frequently a litigant is delayed or otherwise disadvantaged by the
unnecessary disqualification of his lawyer under the appearance of
impropriety doctrine, the greater the likelihood of public suspicion of
both the bar and the judiciary. 90
There is also the possibility that the ethical principles of the Code of
Professional Responsibility may become devalued in the eyes of the
public and the profession because of their use as a mere tactic in the
litigation process. 9'
It is perhaps because of these difficulties that the Seventh Circuit
chose not to rely solely on the "appearances" of the situation. By al-
lowing fact to refute appearance, the court may be establishing a stan-
dard by which appearances of impropriety can be judged.
Appearances would be examined from the viewpoint of someone like
the reasonable prudent person of tort law: the objective, informed ob-
server. Despite the court's failure to explain its application or lack of
application of canon 9 in Novo, the decision yields an equitable result
and will serve as a sound basis for consistent and fair treatment of simi-
lar cases in the future.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit's application of the rebuttable presumption in
Novo preserves the spirit of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Client confidences are adequately protected by the Novo decision and
canon 9 is applied in a reasonable manner. Appearances of impropri-
ety were analyzed in Novo, not from the standpoint of one ignorant of
the facts, but from the point of view of one who forms opinions based
upon the facts. Overall, the Seventh Circuit has applied the rules gov-
erning attorney disqualification in such a manner as to give full weight
88. Id at 333-41.
89. 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976).
90. Id at 813.
91. See, e.g., Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976); International
Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1975); Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v.
Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Colo. 1976). See also O'Toole, supra note 13,
at 313-14. As a trial tactic, the motion to disqualify can be extremely burdensome to the client
forced to change attorneys in the middle of litigation. For example, in Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978), Westinghouse's
counsel was disqualified almost two years after the litigation began. At times, the court will even
bar the client's new counsel from using the disqualified attorney's work product. See First Wis.
Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978). See also Note, Access to Work
Product of Disqualifted Counsel, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 443 (1979), for a general analysis of this issue.
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to the spirit of the Code of Professional Responsibility while achieving
equitable results.
LINDA E. LACY
